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I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of school desegregation in the United States is a 
troubled one. Before 1954, most public schools in southern states 
were racially segregated by state constitution or statutory mandate. 
This legally enforced segregation is known as de jure segregation. l 
School desegregation by court order began in the South in 1954 
with Brown v. Board of Education,2 which abolished de jure segrega-
tion in public education.3 The Supreme Court intended that this 
court order eliminate single-race schools and lead to racial integra-
tion of public schools. 4 It failed to do so. 
In response to Brown, southern state legislatures erased edu-
cation clauses which mandated segregation from their constitutions 
and statute books, and many school boards implemented freedom 
of choice student assignment plans.5 Freedom of choice plans al-
lowed students to attend the school of their choice, regardless of 
their race. While freedom of choice plans complied with the letter 
of the Brown ruling, they did not comply with the spirit. Freedom 
of choice plans frustrated Brown's goal of racial desegregation be-
cause few African-Americans chose to risk violence and ostracism 
by attending the former Caucasian schools, and virtually no Cau-
casians chose to attend former African-American schools.6 In the 
I De jure segregation "refers to segregation directly intended or mandated by law or 
otherwise issuing from an official racial classification or in other words to segregation which 
has or had the sanction of the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (5th ed. 1979). 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown /). References in the text to Brown include both Brown I, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
4 See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,435-36 (1968). 
5 See, e.g., id. 
6 Id. at 440-41. 
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ten years that followed Brown's abolition of de jure segregation, 
little desegregation took place in the South.7 Thus, freedom of 
choice plans failed as a method of school desegregation. Federal 
district courts responded to the failure of freedom of choice plans 
by forcing school boards to implement mandatory student assign-
ment plans to achieve unitariness.8 Mandatory student assignment 
plans allow parents no choice in where their children attend school. 
Many parents of public school students, however, believe that 
they should have the right to choose the school that their child 
attends.9 This issue is hotly contested, and there are a wide array 
of arguments on both sides of the debate. A theme of the choice in 
education movement is that choice incorporates two bedrock prin-
ciples of democracy-freedom and competition. 10 In theory, choice 
in education is modeled on marketplace principles. ll Proponents of 
choice in education, including the Bush Administration,12 argue 
that competition among schools benefits students because it forces 
schools to enhance their educational programs. 13 Competition 
forces schools to "shape up or shut down."14 
7 See id. 
S See id. at 439. Although the Supreme Court has not defined the term unitary, "the 
Court has suggested that the elimination of 'invidious racial distinctions' related to student 
assignment, transportation, support personnel, and extracurricular activities, and [aJ school 
administration's concern for producing and maintaining schools of like quality, facilities, and 
staffs meet a threshold showing of unitariness," Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 
1491-92, n.15 (lOth Cir. 1989) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. I, 18 (1971). 
9 According to a 1986 Gallup poll, 68% of all parents of public school students believe 
that they should have the right to choose the public school that their child attends, Rossell 
& Glenn, The Cambridge Controlled Choice Plan, 20 URS. REv. 75, 77 (1988). 
10 Cohen, Movement for Parental School Choice Debated, Boston Globe, Apr. 17, 1990, at I, 
col. 2. 
11 Wells, Quest for Improving Schools Finds Role for Free Market, N. Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, 
at AI, col. 2. 
12 National Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos has stated that parental choice in edu-
cation is the "cornerstone" of the Bush Administration's educational policy, while President 
13ush, himself, has referred to parental choice as "the single most promising idea" in contem-
porary education. Daniels, Cavazos Presses Parental Choice in Public Schools, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
18, 1989, at B8, col. 3. 
13 Id. 
14 Wells, supra note 11. Additionally, parents desire choice because of the increasingly 
popular belief that a uniform instructional method does not meet the needs of every student. 
Rossell & Glenn, supra note 9 at 77. For example, choice in education permits the existence 
of gifted and talented programs for students with special strengths, handicapped and learning 
disabled programs for students with special needs, and programs for bilingual students. Id. 
Choice plans often involve magnet schools that feature curricula organized around a special 
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Opponents of choice respond, however, that choice in educa-
tion is a "regressive idea."15 They argue that giving people the 
freedom to choose among schools may lead to segregation on the 
basis of income and race. lfi They argue that just as in the consumer 
marketplace, people with fewer resources receive lower quality 
goods." Students from low-income families, often racial minorities, 
have fewer resources available to help them make informed choices 
or to transfer to schools outside their neighborhoods. '8 Also, op-
ponents argue that a marketplace philosophy allows poor schools 
to decline gradually in enrollment until they are forced to close. In 
the meantime, many students receive inferior educations. 19 
This controversy has led to a search for student assignment 
plans that incorporate parental choice yet prevent racial and eco-
nomic isolation.20 A nine-year-old plan called controlled choice pur-
ports to strike this balance effectively. 2 I The Supreme Court has 
not yet decided a case in which the constitutionality of a controlled 
choice plan was at issue. In fact, there has been little litigation in 
the lower courts concerning controlled choice. This Note examines 
theme, such as computers, science or performing arts. Armor, After Busing: Education and 
Choice, PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1989, at 28. 
15 Seder, Making Schools Compete for Students Is No Panacea, Hartford Courant, Nov. 5, 
1989, at C3, col. l. 
16 Wells, supra note 11. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. Furthermore, choice opponents maintain that in a system of choice and competi-
tion, school administrators devote more time to public relations to attract students, than to 
actual improvement of their school's curricula. Seder, supra note 15. Administrators hide 
their school's weaknesses, thus frustrating parents' hopes of making informed choices. Id. 
Additionally, choice opponents contend that school administrators focus on designing su-
perficially glamorous programs, rather than on teaching the basics. "It looks good on paper, 
but it doesn't matter if a school offers tourism if they don't offer a decent foreign language 
or math program," says a senior policy analyst at the Massachusetts Advocacy Center. Riba-
deneira, Confusion Is Feared in Student Placement, Boston Globe, Dec. 5, 1989, at 29, col. 6. 
"Unless choice is coupled with school restructuring and real reform in the classrooms, it will 
fail as a method of improving schools," maintains an assistant to the President of the American 
Federation of Teachers. Cohen, supra note 10. 
20 See Armor, supra note 14, at 24-25. 
21 Alves & Willie, Controlled Choice Assignments: A New and More Effective Approach to School 
Desegregation, 19 URB. REV. 67, 74-75 (1987). Michael Alves, a desegregation expert, and 
Charles Glenn, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Office of Educational Equity, coined 
the phrase controlled choice to "stress the importance of subjecting parent choice to controls 
that would assure equity and educational improvement for all pupils." C. Glenn, Controlled 
Choice in Boston: The First Year 6 (Apr. 1990) (a report issued by the Massachusetts 
Department of Education, Office of Educational Equity). 
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the constitutionality of controlled choice plans in light of school 
desegregation laws created during the past thirty-five years. 
Controlled choice is distinct from the freedom of choice plans 
of the 1960s which the Court held unconstitutional, because con-
trolled choice uses quotas to ensure racial balance in schools. Thus, 
a court would not strike down a controlled choice plan on the same 
grounds used to invalidate freedom of choice plans. In a challenge 
to any student assignment plan, a crucial issue is the burden of 
proof. There is currently a conflict among the federal circuits re-
garding the proper allocation of the burden of proof in litigation 
concerning a school system that has achieved unitariness.22 This 
Note demonstrates that a plaintiff-student would have difficulty 
challenging a controlled choice plan if forced to carry the burden. 
Finally, this Note demonstrates that a controlled choice plan's use 
of racial quotas is constitutionally problematic because the Court 
has approved only the limited use of quotas.23 
II. HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION 
In the 1954 landmark case Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public education is 
unconstitutional. 24 The Court ruled that state-mandated separation 
of African-American students from Caucasian students in public 
schools is a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment.25 The Court stated, "To separate [African-American 
school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in 
a way unlikely ever to be undone."26 The Court remanded the four 
cases it had consolidated in Brown to the federal district courts to 
enforce its order to desegregate the racially separated systems.27 
In the years following Brown, many school districts imple-
mented freedom of choice plans to end legally enforced segregation 
in compliance with Brown.28 As previously stated, these plans had 
little impact on the racial composition of schools because Caucasian 
22 See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986); Riddick V. School 
Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). 
2S Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,25 (1971). 
24 Brown V. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954). 
25 [d. 
26 [d. at 494. 
27 Brown V. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
28 See, e.g., Green V. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
1991] CONTROLLED CHOICE PLANS 87 
parents kept their children in schools that traditionally enrolled 
only Caucasian students, and few African-Americans chose to send 
their children to the formerly Caucasian-only schools.29 After four-
teen years of virtually no change in the racial composition of schools, 
it was evident that the spirit of Brown had been ignored. In 1968, 
the Court took Brown one step further with Green v. County School 
Board.30 
In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that segregated school sys-
tems not only have the duty to refrain from enforcing segregation, 
but also have an affirmative obligation to achieve desegregation.31 
The Green case involved a small rural school district in New Kent 
County, Virginia, in which half the population was African-Amer-
ican and half was Caucasian.32 There were only two schools in the 
county, and there was little residential segregation.33 Before Brown, 
the county school board had operated a racially segregated school 
system as mandated by the Virginia Constitution.34 One school al-
lowed only Caucasian students to attend and the other allowed only 
African-American students.35 In 1965, however, in order to remain 
eligible for federal financial aid, the district adopted a freedom of 
choice plan for desegregating its schools.36 The plan allowed pupils 
to attend either of the county's two schools. Three years after its 
implementation, however, no Caucasian child had chosen to attend 
the former African-American school, and only fifteen percent of 
the African-American children had chosen to attend the former 
Caucasian school.37 
The school board defendant in Green contended that it had 
fully discharged its obligation to desegregate by adopting a plan by 
which all students, regardless of race, could "freely" choose the 
school they would attend.38 The Court, however, found that the 
plan did not adequately comply with the desegregation require-
ments of Brown. 39 The Court charged the school board with the 
affirmative duty to "take whatever steps might be necessary to con-
29 See id. at 440-41 n.5 (1968). 
30 [d. at 430. 
3I [d. at 437-38. 




36 [d. at 433. 
37 [d. at 441. 
38 [d. at 441-42. 
39 [d. 
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vert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch. "40 In rejecting the freedom of choice 
plan, the Court placed the burden on the school board to formulate 
a new plan to convert the school system into one without racially 
identifiable schools,4l The Court suggested geographic zoning as a 
way to achieve this result.42 
In small rural areas, such as New Kent County, where little 
residential segregation existed, the elimination of freedom of choice 
plans and the implementation of geographic zoning resulted in 
desegregation.43 In large, residentially segregated urban areas, how-
ever, geographic zoning alone did not solve the problem.44 These 
areas required more intensive measures. Therefore, in a 1971 de-
cision, the Court authorized the use of mandatory student assign-
ments and crosstown busing in the desegregation of large urban 
school systems.45 In that case, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, the Court stated that district courts could require local 
authorities to employ bus transportation as one tool of desegrega-
tion, as long as the time the students spent traveling did not ad-
versely affect their health or education.46 
Two years after Swann, in Ke_yes v. School District, the Court held 
that if intentional discrimination is found in a portion of a school 
district, a court may require the school board to design a plan to 
desegregate the entire districtY Keyes was the first non-southern 
desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court.48 The decision 
shifted the focus of desegregation from the South to the rest of the 
country.49 State legislatures outside the South had never mandated 
public school segregation. Yet because of segregated housing pat-
terns and intentional gerrymandering of school attendance zones 
by school authorities, many schools were racially identifiable.50 
As a result of landmark decisions such as Brown, Green, and 
Keyes, school boards across the nation had an affirmative duty to 
40 [d. at 437-38. 
41 [d. at 442. The Court in Green did not find freedom of choice plans unconstitutional 
per se but held that where such plans fail to eliminate segregation, other means must be 
employed. [d. at 439-40. 
" [d. at 442 n.6. 
43 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 715 (11 th ed. 1985). 
44 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 14 (1971). 
45 [d. at 29-30. 
46 [d. at 30-31. 
47 Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,208 (1973). 
48 Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
4Y [d. at 218. 
50 See id. at 191; see aLm, Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 67-68. 
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desegregate their systems. With court-ordered desegregation, 
school boards were charged with developing their own desegrega-
tion plans,5' but the district courts often modified or redesigned 
the plans.52 Desegregation plans formulated during the 1970s usu-
ally entailed mandatory student assignment and mandatory bus-
ing.53 The plans incorporated little parental choice. Mandatory stu-
dent assignment plans were unpopular with parents and often led 
to racial violence54 and "white flight" from public schools.55 The 
theory of controlled choice is a response to dissatisfaction with 
mandatory student assignment plans. Controlled choice marks a 
departure from the strict controls of mandatory assignment, while 
adhering to the legal principles established by Brown and its prog-
eny. 
III. OPERATION OF A CONTROLLED CHOICE PLAN 
The goal of controlled choice is to maximize parental choice 
while ensuring desegregation and improved educational opportu-
nities.56 Controlled choice was first introduced as an educational 
concept in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the early 1980s.57 It has 
been adopted in such cities as White Plains, New York; Seattle, 
Washington; and Port St. Lucie, Florida.58 In Massachusetts, sixteen 
of the state's 436 school districts have implemented controlled 
51 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1967). 
52 See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 230 (D. Mass. 1975). In Brown, the 
Supreme Court granted power to the federal district courts to oversee and modify the actions 
of local school boards. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955). 
53 See Armor, supra note 14, at 25. 
54 See, e.g., Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at 224-25. 
55 Cuddy, A Proposal to Achieve Desegregation Through Free Choice, AM. EDUC., May, 1983, 
at 27. In Boston, for example, Caucasian enrollment plummeted from 65% to 30% during 
eight years of mandatory busing. [d. Today, Caucasian enrollment in the Boston public school 
system is approximately 20%. Ribadeneira, Court Pullout From Schools Raises Fears, Boston 
Globe, May 3, 1990, at I, col. 1. 
During the years of mandatory busing, Caucasian enrollment declined over 40% in 
Philadelphia, over 45% in New York City, over 60% in Chicago, and over 75% in Detroit. 
Cuddy, supra, at 27. Given these statistics, it appears that mandatory busing contributes to 
the existence of racially-identifiable schools. Id. Thus, mandatory student assignment does 
not necessarily achieve its goal of integration. 
56 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 74. 
57 C. Glenn, supra note 21, at 6. Glenn distinguishes controlled choice from theories of 
choice which promote "unrestricted market forces in education." Id. at 3. The latter, he 
points out, often negatively affect low income and minority students. Id. 
58 Joint Affidavit of Charles Willie and Michael Alves at 6-7, Morgan v. Nucci, (No. 72-
911-G) (1989) [hereinafter Affidavit]. 
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choice plans.59 Cambridge implemented its controlled choice plan 
in 1981 to desegregate its school system,60 and the system has been 
hailed as a model of success of choice in education.61 In Boston in 
1989, a controlled choice plan replaced the desegregation plan that 
was implemented by court order in 1974 after a judicial finding of 
intentional segregation in the school system.62 Thus, a controlled 
choice plan can be used to expand choice in a school system that 
needs to achieve or maintain desegregation. 
Controlled choice plans eliminate geographic attendance zones 
and allow students to select schools on a district-wide basis.63 To 
determine which school a student will attend, parents first select a 
predetermined number of schools, and rank them in order of pref-
erence.64 School selection for the fall takes place before the end of 
59 Wells, supra note 11. 
60 See generally Rossell & Glenn, supra note 9, at S4. 
61 jordan, Don't Count This Integration Plan Out, Boston Globe, Aug. 12, 1990, at A19, 
col. 3. 
62 Morgan v. Herrigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 4S2 (D. Mass. 1974), afl'd sub nom. Morgan 
v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 5S0 (1st Cir. 1974). After finding that school authorities had purpose-
fully operated a segregated school system, United States District Court judge Arthur Garrity 
ordered that the Boston public school system assign students to schools using a desegregation 
plan known as "geocoding." See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, (D. Mass. 1975). This 
plan utilized "eight hundred defined geographic areas developed originally as police report-
ing areas .... For pupils resident in each geocode there was a designated elementary school, 
middle school, and high school. Combinations of geocodes were assigned to schools in a way 
calculated to achieve a desegregated enrollment in each school." C. Glenn, supra note 21, at 
5. 
In 19S5, ten years after the court-ordered desegregation plan was implemented, judge 
Garrity gave authority to the Boston School Committee to modify the plan, as long as certain 
racial enrollment guidelines were met. Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214,217, 22S (D. 
Mass. 19S5). In 19S9, the school committee adopted a controlled choice plan as "an attempt 
to reduce the role of mandatory assignments in meeting the desegregation obligations of the 
school system and also a means of stimulating school improvement." C. Glenn, supra note 
21, at 3. In 19S9, the plan was implemented on a "pilot basis," affecting only kindergarten, 
first and sixth grade students, while the geocode system remained in effect for all other 
grade levels. Id. at 1, 7. In 1990, the controlled choice plan went into effect for all grade 
levels. See id. at 3. 
The African-American plaintiffs in the original 1974 lawsuit filed a motion to block the 
plan, arguing that it would lead to resegregation of the school system. Memorandum Sup-
porting Plaintiffs' Request for Injunctive Relief at 9, Morgan v. Nucci (No. 72-911-G) (l9S9) 
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum]. The four African-American members of the nine-
person Boston School Committee supported the plaintiffs' opposition to the plan. Id. at 2. 
judge Garrity, however, approved the plan, finding that it would not result in resegregation. 
Morgan v. Nucci, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. May 31, 19S9) (order denying injunctive relief). 
In his report on the first year of Boston's controlled choice plan, Charles Glenn pointed out 
that, contrary to opponents' assertions, the plan resulted in more integration than existed 
under the court-ordered plan. C. Glenn, supra note 21, at S. 
63 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 76,77. 
64 Id. at so. 
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the current school year.65 Parents file their choices with a student 
assignment officer who assesses each application on the basis of 
space availability and racial balance.66 Students are not guaranteed 
enrollment in the school of their choice.67 In order to ensure racial 
balance in each school, controlled choice plans use racial quotas that 
represent the racial mix of the community as a whole.68 If students 
of one race oversubscribe to a particular school, a lottery is held to 
determine which students of that race may enroll and which stu-
dents must be assigned to another school.69 After a controlled choice 
plan is implemented, only students entering a school system for the 
first time, moving to a higher level of schooling, or changing schools 
make selections.70 Once a student is enrolled in a school, he or she 
may remain there until the highest grade level of that school. 
The theory of controlled choice is that when parents select or 
do not select a certain school, they make a judgment on the quality 
of education at that schooPl In this way, controlled choice forces 
each school to "compete" for students, creating attractive educa-
tional programs in order to become a popular choice of parents. 
The school board focuses on improving schools that are not selected 
frequently by parents.72 This feature is essential because it addresses 
the concerns of choice opponents who argue that less frequently 
selected schools will deteriorate until they are forced to close, mean-
while providing students with an inferior education.73 
Dr. Charles Willie, Professor of Education and Urban Studies 
at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Michael Alves, 
former Desegregation Expert and Educational Planner for the May-
or's Office in Boston,74 stress that a controlled choice plan must 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 80-81. 
67 Id. at 76. 
68 Id. at 78. 
69 Id. at 81. 
70 See id. at 79-80. See, e.g., C. Glenn, supra note 21, at 6-7. 
71 Rossell, The Buffalo Controlled Choice Plan, 22 URB. EDuc. 328, 352 (1987). See, e.g., 
Letter from Laval S. Wilson, (now former) Superintendent of Boston Public Schools, to 
Parents and Students (Mar. 30, 1989) (On file with the Boston College Third World Law 
Journal office). 
72 Id. 
" C. Glenn, supra note 21, at 38. 
74 Dr. Willie is a sociologist who has written several books on school desegregation. In 
1975, Dr. Willie was appointed a Master by the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts to formulate a school desegregation plan for Boston. In 1975, Michael 
Alves was employed by the Massachusetts Department of Education to assist the Boston 
public school system in the implementation of its court-ordered desegregation plan. He also 
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incorporate the following five operating procedures to ensure de-
segregation: 
1. Eliminate all geographic school attendance zones. 
2. Adopt and enforce a definition of desegregation that guarantees 
each race proportional access to every school. 
3. Allow parents to make multiple school selections but with no 
guarantee that they will receive their first choice. 
4. Implement an effective parent information and outreach pro-
gram. 
S. Ensure honesty and integrity in all school assignments.75 
With regard to geographic attendance zones, Dr. Willie ex-
plains: "A fundamental principle underlying controlled choice is 
that all children have a right to an instructionally effective, deseg-
regated education, but that no child has an implied property right 
to attend a particular school."76 While the neighborhood school is 
a traditional part of American education, in residentially segregated 
areas neighborhood zoning inevitably leads to segregation.77 Many 
desegregation plans, therefore, attempt to integrate schools by re-
drawing school attendance zones so that each zone includes differ-
ent ethnic and racially identifiable neighborhoods.78 This approach 
to desegregation, however, is often unsuccessful. Elementary school 
zones are usually too small to embrace fl mixed racial population.79 
Also, population shifts can lead to resegregation of a once inte-
grated zone. 80 
Another approach to desegregation is to close a school building 
in a minority neighborhood and disperse its student body through-
assisted in the development and implementation of desegregation plans in several other 
Massachusetts cities. In 1988, both Dr. Willie and Michael Alves were engaged by the Boston 
Mayor's Office as consultants to develop a controlled choice plan for Boston. They have 
participated, either individually or jointly, in the development and implementation of con-
trolled choice plans in at least eleven cities. See Affidavit, supra note 58. 
75 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 76. 
76 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
77 See id. at 67-68. 
78 Id. at 68. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 69. The Court has held that a school board is not constitutionally obligated to 
make yearly adjustments of the racial compositions of schools in a system that has been 
desegregated by court order. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,31-
32 (1971). This ruling leaves little judicial remedy for the problem of resegregation of 
geographic attendance zones due to population shifts. 
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out the remaining schools in the district.8! The minority students 
are forced to relocate to a school outside their neighborhood, while 
their Caucasian peers remain in a school in their own neighborhood. 
At least one circuit has ruled that this method of desegregation 
unfairly places the burden of desegregation on the minority 
race(s).82 Unlike desegregation plans that incorporate geographic 
attendance zones, controlled choice plans allow parents to select the 
school best suited to their child's needs from within their entire 
district.83 "Controlled choice has broken the hostage relationship 
between real estate and the public schools," says Dr. Willie.84 
While controlled choice plans do not utilize geographic zoning, 
a controlled choice plan may address the fact that parents prefer 
to have their children attend school close to home. The Cambridge 
controlled choice plan, for example, takes into consideration where 
a student lives when making school assignments. In Cambridge, a 
student who selects a school in his or her neighborhood is given 
priority over a student from another neighborhood if the assign-
ment does not create racial imbalance.85 In 1986, forty-two percent 
of the students in Cambridge public schools attended a school lo-
cated in their neighborhood.86 At the same time, however, the sys-
tem was fairly well desegregated. The average minority student 
attended a school with approximately fifty-two percent Caucasian 
enrollment.87 
The success of the Cambridge model in allowing so many stu-
dents to attend school near home while maintaining desegregation 
stems from the fact that Cambridge has a small school district with 
a reasonable level of residential integration.88 In larger school sys-
tems, however, the elimination of all geographic attendance zones 
may pose implementation problems.89 In districts with more than 
twenty thousand students, controlled choice works most effectively 
if the district is subdivided into a few zones, so that maximum travel 
time for students is no more than forty-five minutes.9o For example, 
81 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 69. 
82 See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 793 (6th Cir. 1974). 
83 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 76. 
84 Leslie, Giving Parents A Choice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1988, at 81. 
85 Rossell & Glenn, supra note 9, at 84. 
86 Id. at 85. 
87 Id. at 89. 
88 [d. at 82. 
89 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 77. 
90 [d. 
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when controlled choice was adopted in Boston in 1989, the city was 
subdivided into three zones for all levels except high SChOOPI If 
subdivision of a school district is necessary for administrative ease, 
each subdivision must reflect the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
composition of the entire city.92 
It is generally recognized that students benefit the most from 
a desegregated education in which the racial and ethnic composition 
of their schools closely reflects that of the entire district. 93 The Court 
in Brown asserted that segregated education has an adverse effect 
on the opportunities, motivation, and self-perception of African-
American students.94 Nevertheless, many school boards implement 
desegregation plans that are least offensive to Caucasians, rather 
than plans that are most beneficial to African-Americans.95 Often, 
these plans result in superficial integration. 96 For example, a school 
is only superficially integrated if its composition is within plus or 
minus twenty percent of the racial or ethnic composition of the 
school district. 97 In order to guarantee true desegregation, Dr. Willie 
and Mr. Alves recommend that under a controlled choice plan, the 
racial enrollments of each school fall within plus or minus five to 
ten percent of the composition of the whole attendance area.98 
A goal of controlled choice is to honor the greatest number of 
choices possible.99 In Cambridge, for example, from 1982 through 
1986, the school board assigned an average of seventy-three percent 
of all new students to their first choice school and eighteen percent 
to their second or third choice school. 100 Only nine percent received 
an involuntary assignment. 101 Generally, the earlier that parents 
register, the more likely they will receive their first choice. 102 For 
example, in Cambridge in 1982, only twelve percent of all students 
were given mandatory assignments. l03 Fifty percent of the students 
91 Boston School Department, Student Assignment Plan for Boston Public Schools, 
Revised Executive Summary 1 (May 26, 1989). 
92 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 77. 
93 [d. at 78. 
94 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). 
95 M. Fultz & C. Willie, Do Mandatory School Desegregation Plans Foster White Flight?, in 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT WORK 163-64 (C. Willie ed. 1984). 
96 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 78. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. 
99 Rossell, supra note 71, at 351. 
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who did not enter the system until the opening of school in Septem-
ber, however, were given mandatory assignments. 104 As racial trends 
in mobility demonstrate that minorities are more likely than Cau-
casians to be newcomers to a district, a higher percentage of mi-
norities miss the advantage of registration in the previous school 
year. 105 Thus, the importance of early registration may be racially 
discriminatory. For example, in Cambridge in 1984, the number of 
minority students who received mandatory assignments was six per-
cent higher than for Caucasian students. I06 
Finally, under a controlled choice plan, it is essential that a 
school district have an effective parent outreach program, including 
parent information centers that help parents make informed 
choices. lo7 The school board should distribute literature about the 
application process in several languages, and it should provide 
transportation for parents unable to reach the information centers 
on their own. School administrators should arrange for parents to 
visit schools and meet with prospective teachers and staff. In many 
districts using controlled choice, schools hold "open houses" for 
parents during the selection period, and some information centers 
provide checklists that aid parents in evaluating schools. lOS Overall, 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 88. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 80. In White Plains, New York, for example, parents of prospective kinder-
garten students may set up an interview at the Parent Information Center, during which a 
staff member explains the controlled choice system and distributes brochures describing each 
elementary school. Keegan, White Plains Parents Choosing Schools, N.V. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, 
§ 12, at 12, col. l. 
In Cambridge, Lawrence, and Lowell, Massachusetts, schools use the parent information 
centers as a method of recruiting new students. Schools also advertise in local newspapers, 
hold promotions at local nursery schools, and have "meet-the-principal nights" for parents 
of prospective students. Leslie, supra note 84, at 79. 
108 See, e.g., J. Ferriabough & S. Kooperstein, Introducing ... The New Boston Student 
Assignment Plan (Mar. 30, 1989) (an information brochure distributed by the Boston School 
Committee and the Boston School Department). In the Boston controlled choice lawsuit, the 
plaintiffs' arguments illustrated the irnportance of effective parental information and out-
reach. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 62, at 10-1l. The plaintiffs argued that the 
Boston School Department's failure to provide parents with adequate information and trans-
portation to visit schools led to racially segregative selections by parents. Id. The plaintiffs 
pointed out that the school department distributed applications before it provided parents 
with information about schools in the system. [d. at 10. As a result, many parents returned 
their school selection applications without having made informed choices. [d. The plaintiffs 
also argued that the school department did not provide an adequate system of transportation 
to assist parents in visiting schools. Id. at 10-1l. No transportation was available to parents 
on weekdays after working hours or on weekends. [d. at 10 n.19. The plaintiffs alleged that 
because of vast residential segregation in Boston, the lack of transportation available to low-
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with parent information centers, as well as the elimination of geo-
graphic zoning and the use of quotas to ensure racial balance, 
controlled choice plans strike a balance between mandatory assign-
ment and absolute freedom of choice. 
IV. CONTROLLED CHOICE DISTINGUISHED FROM FREEDOM OF 
CHOICE 
In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that a freedom of choice 
student assignment plan was unconstitutional because it failed to 
bring about the goal of desegregation set forth in Brown. IOg The 
Court did not hold, however, that choice plans are unconstitutional 
per se. 110 With the use of racial quotas to help prevent segregation, 
controlled choice is distinguishable from the freedom of choice plan 
in Green. Although this issue has not come before the Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit distinguished controlled choice from free-
dom of choice in Diaz v. San] ose Unified School District. I II 
In that case, the court of appeals found that in using a neigh-
borhood student assignment plan, the school board in San Jose, 
California, acted with segregative intent in maintaining imbalanced 
schools. 112 To remedy this constitutional violation, the court fash-
ioned a plan similar to controlled choice to achieve desegregation. 113 
The plan allowed students to rank their school preferences. 114 The 
plan featured district-wide magnet schools and schools with spe-
cialty enrichment programs. 115 These schools were designed to en-
courage students to attend schools outside their own neighbor-
hoods, in an attempt to achieve voluntary desegregation. 116 If 
voluntary choices did not lead to sufficient desegregation, however, 
the school board would impose "ethnic caps" (quotas) to achieve the 
desired racial and ethnic balance in the schools. ll7 The court ex-
plained that "ethnic caps" were "a means of establishing a limit on 
income minority parents to visit schools outside their own neighborhoods resulted in racially 
segregative selections. [d. at 10-11. 
109 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968). 
110 [d. at 440. 
III 733 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1984). 
II. [d. at 675. 
liS Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 815-19 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
II' [d. at 813. 
115 !d. at 812. 
116 [d. In 1984, the San Jose public school system enrolled 30,565 students, 57% Cau-
casian and 43% minorities. The school district was very residentially segregated. [d. at 809. 
117 [d. at 818. 
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the enrollment of new students of a particular ethnicity at selected 
schools."1l8 Administrators were to assign students to one of their 
three choices unless the "ethnic cap" barred their enrollment, in 
which case the office of desegregation advised them of their other 
options. 119 
The plaintiffs in Diaz, a class of Hispanic students, challenged 
the assignment plan as a violation of Green's holding that a freedom 
of choice plan is an inadequate means of achieving desegregation. 120 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the plan, distinguishing 
it from the freedom of choice plan in Green because the "ethnic 
caps" as well as the magnet schools and specialty enrichment pro-
grams ensured effective desegregation. l2l The court of appeals also 
stated that the San Jose plan "reflects Green's admonition that 'free-
dom of choice is not an end in itself,' but that it may have a proper 
place in a desegregation plan."122 The Diaz case demonstrates that 
choice in education is not per se unconstitutional. 
V. BURDEN OF PROOF AFTER A FINDING OF UNITARINESS 
A plaintiff in a school desegregation lawsuit has the initial 
burden of establishing purposeful discrimination on the part of the 
authorities. 123 If the plaintiff reaches this burden and a court de-
termines that a violation has occurred, the school board is under a 
duty to implement a remedial plan that will dismantle the segre-
gated system. 124 The district court retains jurisdiction over the 
school board until the court is satisfied that the system has become 
unitary.125 While under the court's jurisdiction, the school board, if 
challenged, bears the burden of showing that any action it takes 
does not impede desegregation. 126 Once the district court makes a 
finding of unitariness and relinquishes jurisdiction, however, it is 
unclear whether a challenged school board still has the burden to 
justify any actions which lead to racial separation. The federal cir-
cuits differ with regard to this ~ssue, but the Supreme Court has 
liB [d. 
119 [d. at 817-18. 
120 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1988). 
121 [d. at 595-96. 
122 [d. at 596. 
123 See Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,208 (1973). 
124 [d. 
125 Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 
(1986). 
126 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1978). 
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recently decided to hear an appeal from the Tenth Circuit which 
could resolve the conflict. 127 
The Tenth Circuit case, Board of Education v. Dowell, contrasted 
with a Fourth Circuit case, Riddick v. School Board, best illustrates 
the conflict. According to the Fourth Circuit, after ajudicial finding 
of unitariness and the termination of a district court's supervision, 
a school board no longer has the burden of justifying its actions. 128 
A plaintiff, in challenging an action of the school board after a 
finding of unitariness, carries the burden of proving discriminatory 
intent. 129 The Tenth Circuit, however, disputes this allocation, and 
has ruled that the burden of proof remains with the school board 
after a finding of unitariness. 13o 
In Riddick v. School Board, the plaintiffs challenged a school 
district's return to a neighborhood school plan after a finding of 
unitariness in the school system. l3l Following a finding that the 
Norfolk, Virginia, school board operated a segregated school sys-
tem, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia ordered implementation of an assignment plan that uti-
lized busing and other techniques to desegregate its schools. 132 In 
1975, the district court determined that the school board had elim-
inated racial segregation and that the school system was unitary. 133 
The court then relinquished its jurisdiction, and the school board 
was free to implement a new student assignment plan. 134 
The school board continued mandatory crosstown busing until 
1983. 135 At that time, however, the board became alarmed about 
the loss of Caucasian students from the school system. 136 The board 
attributed the declining Caucasian enrollment to busing. 137 There-
127 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted 110 S. Ct. 
1521, 1522 (No. 89-1080) (l990). A resolution of this conflict among the circuits "could be 
the most important desegregation issue of [this] decade." Taylor, Court Won't Hear 2 Busing 
Appeals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, at AI, col. 1. 
12B Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535. 
129 Id. at 537. 
130 Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1986). 
131 Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984). 
132 See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 524-25. 
133 Id. at 525. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. In 1969 through 1970, the Norfolk public schools enrolled 56,830 students, 57% 
Caucasian and 43% African-American. In 1980 through 1981, the total enrollment dropped 
to 36,643, 42.6% Caucasian and 57.4% African-American. By 1983, the total enrollment had 
declined to 34,803, with 42% Caucasian students and 48% African-American students. Id. 
137 Id. at 526. An expert hired by the school board concluded that if busing continued, 
1991] CONTROLLED CHOICE PLANS 99 
fore, it proposed the elimination of crosstown busing and a return 
to a neighborhood school assignment plan for elementary school 
students. 138 The neighborhood plan was to result in six of Norfolk's 
thirty-six elementary schools becoming seventy percent or more 
Caucasian, and twelve schools becoming seventy percent or more 
African-American. 139 Of those twelve schools, ten were to become 
ninety-five percent or more African-American. 14o 
A class of African-American schoolchildren brought suit 
against the school board challenging its adoption of the plan as 
racially discriminatory.141 Although the proposed plan would create 
several racially-identifiable schools, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court to allow its implementation because 
the plaintiffs could not establish discriminatory intent on the part 
of the school board. 142 The court of appeals stated: "While the effect 
of the plan in creating several [African-American] schools is dis-
quieting, that fact alone is not sufficient to prove discriminatory 
intent."143 The court of appeals relied on its previous finding in 
Vaughns v. Board of Education 144 that '''[o]nce a school system has 
achieved unitary status, a court may not order further relief to 
counter-act resegregation that does not result from the school sys-
tem's intentionally discriminatory acts."'145 The court of appeals 
held that the district court's 1975 finding of unitariness returned 
control of the school system to the Norfolk school board. 146 The 
burden of proof then shifted to the plaintiffs to show that the school 
board's adoption of a new assignment plan was intentionally dis-
criminatory.147 The plaintiffs challenged this allocation of proof, 
claiming that the burden should remain on the school board to 
prove that the new assignment plan would not "perpetuate the 
the school system would be 75% African-American by 1987. With this ratio, the average 
child would not be educated in a desegregated school. While the expert believed that busing 
had initially led to racial balance, he believed that resegregation was inevitable with such a 
rapid attrition of Caucasian students. [d. 
138 [d. at 526-27. The attendance zones were to be drawn to maximize racial integration. 
!d. at 527. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. at 524. 
142 [d. at 543. 
143 !d. 
144 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985). 
145 Riddick, 784 F.2d at 536 (quoting Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 988). 
146 [d. at 538. 
147 [d. 
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vestiges of the past de jure dual system," but the court of appeals 
rejected this argument. 148 
In Dowell v. Board of Education, the Tenth Circuit criticized the 
Fourth Circuit's recasting of the burden of proof in Riddick. 149 In 
Dowell, after many years of litigation in the Oklahoma City public 
school system, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Oklahoma found that the school system had achieved 
unitariness. 15o The court terminated active supervision of the school 
board, and the board adopted a new student assignment plan. 151 
The new plan resulted in thirty-three of the system's sixty-four 
elementary schools becoming ninety percent single-race. 152 The 
plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case, but the court denied 
the motion and determined that absent a showing of discriminatory 
intent, the existence of racially identifiable schools is not unconsti-
tutional. 153 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court had 
erred in denying the motion and had improperly placed the burden 
of proving discriminatory intent on the plaintiffs. 154 The court of 
appeals held that the finding of unitariness did not negate the 
existence of the original desegregation order.155 The court of ap-
peals maintained that the district court retained its power to enforce 
the mandatory desegregation order, and the defendant school 
board had a continuing duty to eliminate the vestiges of segrega-
tion. 156 The court stated: "[T]he purpose of court-ordered school 
integration is not only to achieve, but also to maintain, a unitary 
school system . . . . [T]he plaintiffs, as the beneficiaries of the 
original injunction, only have the burden of showing the court's 
mandatory order has been violated."157 If, for example, a new as-
signment plan reintroduces a measure of segregation, the school 
board "must present evidence that ... changed conditions require 
modification [of the original desegregation order] or that the facts 
or law no longer require enforcement of the order."158 Thus, the 
court placed the burden of proof with the school board. 
148 /d. at 534. 
149 Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1520 n.3 (10th Cir. 1986). 
150 [d. at 1518. 
151 [d. 
152 [d. 
153 Id. at 1518-19. 
154 [d. at 1517, 1523. 
155 /d. at 1519. 
156 [d. at 1520. 
157 /d. at 1520, 1523. 
158 /d. at 1521, 1523. In United States v. Overton, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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The allocation of the burden of proof after a finding of uni-
tariness is crucial to a constitutional analysis of a controlled choice 
plan. Often, a controlled choice plan is implemented to maintain 
racial balance in a school district that has achieved desegregation. 159 
The allocation of the burden of proof under Riddick may make 
success elusive for a plaintiff challenging a new student assignment 
plan in a school system with a judicial finding of unitariness. In 
Riddick, the fact that the new assignment plan would lead to rese-
gregation was insufficient to establish discriminatory intent on the 
part of the school board. Thus, it would appear impossible to prove 
discriminatory intent on the part of a school board that implements 
a controlled choice plan for the stated purpose of maintaining 
desegregation, even if the plan failed to maintain desegregation. As 
a result of Riddick, "[T]he question ... has arisen whether ... any 
plaintiffs can meet the requisite burden of proof of discriminatory 
intent in a school system that already has achieved unitary status 
.... [T]he Riddick court's requirement of proof of discriminatory 
intent may discourage future plaintiffs with potentially legitimate 
grievances from seeking judicial review."160 
On the other hand, under Dowell, a court hearing a challenge 
to a controlled choice plan in a system with a finding of unitariness 
would focus on the result of the plan. If the court found that the 
plan maintained racial balance in schools, the court would likely 
uphold the plan. If, however, the plan resulted in a resurgence of 
segregation, the court would require the school board to justify its 
adoption of the plan. 161 
VI. RACIAL QUOTAS IN A CONTROLLED CHOICE PLAN 
The Supreme Court has held that the use of racial quotas for 
affirmative action purposes is a denial of equal protection under 
the fourteenth amendment. 162 In Regents of University of California 
followed the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Riddick and criticized the Dowell court's 
allocation of the burden of proof on the defendant school board. United States v. Overton, 
834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987). The court stated, "we are convinced that [a finding of 
unitariness] must also be accompanied by a release of a unitary district from the burden of 
proving that its decisions are free of segregative purpose." [d. at 1175. 
159 Alves & Willie, supra note 21, at 79. The Riddick court limited the applicability of its 
holding to school systems with ajudicial finding of unitariness. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 
521, 543 (4th Cir. 1986). 
160 Note, The Unitary Finding and the Threat of School Resegregation: Riddick v. School 
Board, 65 N.C.L. REV. 617, 638-39 (1987). 
161 See Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1523. 
162 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978). 
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v. Bakke, a case involving graduate school admissions quotas, a re-
jected Caucasian medical school applicant challenged the validity of 
the school's minority set-aside program on many grounds, including 
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 163 The Court 
held that the University of California at Davis Medical School's rigid 
use of quotas was unconstitutional,164 The Court stated: 
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body 
some specified percentage of a particular group merely because 
of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be 
rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring 
members of anyone group for no reason other than race or 
ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Con-
stitution forbids. 165 
The Court suggested in Bakke that racial quotas are constitu-
tional when used to remedy identified discrimination,166 but not 
when implemented in response to "the effects of 'societal discrimi-
nation,' an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its 
reach into the past."167 The Court reaffirmed this position in City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.16S In that case, the city of Richmond, 
Virginia, required contractors that were awarded city construction 
jobs to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of 
their contracts to businesses owned by minorities. 169 The Court held 
that this system violated the equal protection clause because the city 
had not implemented the plan to remedy discrimination against 
Richmond contractors specificallyYo Rather, the city claimed that it 
had adopted the plan in response to the effects of discrimination 
in the construction industry in general. 171 The Court stated: "Like 
the claim that discrimination in primary and secondary schooling 
justifies a rigid racial preference in medical schools admissions, an 
amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a par-
ticular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial 
quota." 172 
163 [d. at 277-78. 
164 [d. at 307. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. at 307-09. 
167 [d. at 307. 
168 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
169 [d. at 712-13. 
170 [d. at 730. 
l7l [d. at 723. 
172 [d. at 724. 
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Bakke and Croson raise the question of whether the Court would 
uphold a controlled choice plan's use of racial quotas. In school 
desegregation cases, the Court has allowed the use of racial quotas 
as "a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past 
constitutional violations."173 The Court, however, has authorized 
only the "very limited use" of quotas in formulating the racial 
makeup of a public school.l74 The Court has expressly stated that 
racial balance in schools is not a "substantive constitutional right."175 
Quotas are problematic both in a system that has attained unitary 
status and in a system that has never been desegregated by court 
order because evidence of specifically identified discrimination, 
which Croson requires, is absent. 
The Court has suggested that once a school system achieves 
unitary status, the Court will not look to the past to find the requisite 
evidence of discrimination. In Keyes, the Court stated: "[A]t some 
point in time the relationship between past segregative acts and 
. present segregation may become so attenuated as to be incapable 
of supporting a finding of de jure segregation warranting judicial 
intervention."176 Federal courts of appeals have also implied an 
unwillingness to look to the past. For example, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated in Riddick v. School Board: "While this history 
of discrimination cannot and should not be ignored, it 'cannot in 
the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is 
not itself unlawful.'"177 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that 
"a finding of unitariness and dismissal . . . means that a school 
district has removed the taint of prior discrimination and attained 
the same legal status as a district that never has discriminated."178 
Thus, in any school system that is not under a court order to 
desegregate, the use of racial quotas may not withstand attack. 
Although the use of racial quotas is the feature that sets con-
trolled choice apart from the freedom of choice plan struck down 
in Green, the Court's aversion to racial quotas is problematic for a 
controlled choice plan. For example, students excluded from the 
school of their choice under a controlled choice plan could challenge 
the plan's use of racial quotas on the same grounds that the plaintiff 
173 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). 
174 [d. 
175 [d. at 24. 
176 Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,211 (1973). 
177 Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)). 
178 United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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in Bakke challenged the medical school's admissions policy. Students 
excluded on the basis of race from a non-magnet or non-specialty 
school would not have a strong equal protection claim, however. As 
long as the school board equalized all schools as mandated by a 
controlled choice plan, the students can receive a similar education 
at any school in the district. Students excluded from a magnet school 
or other special program would have a stronger claim under the 
fourteenth amendment. Arguably, they were excluded from the 
school of their choice on the basis of race and, if no other school 
in the district offers that educational program, they have been 
denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 179 Thus, 
a plaintiff's strongest argument in a challenge to a controlled choice 
plan is that the plan's use of quotas is racially discriminatory. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A controlled choice plan's use of racial quotas is constitutionally 
problematic. If a court finds intentional discrimination in a school 
system, the court will uphold the use of quotas. In a system that 
has achieved unitary status, however, it is questionable whether a 
court would rely on past discrimination to justify such racial classi-
fication. Because a constitutional right to racial balance in public 
schools does not exist, a controlled choice plan's use of racial quotas 
may lead to its downfall. A plaintiff's success in challenging a con-
trolled choice plan, however, will also depend on the Supreme 
Court's resolution of the question of who carries the burden of 
proof in litigation concerning a unitary school system. It is unlikely 
that a plaintiff would prevail if forced to carry the burden of proof. 
As Justice Powell stated in Keyes: "It is well to remember that 
the course we are running is a long one and the goal sought in the 
end-so often overlooked-is the best possible educational oppor-
tunity for all children."18o If a controlled choice plan accomplishes 
its stated purpose of providing students with quality desegregated 
educational opportunities, students have no cause to challenge the 
179 The Seventh Circuit confronted a similar issue in Samayoa v. Chicago Board of Edu-
cation. 798 F.2d 1046, 1048-50 (7th Cir. 1986). In that case, Cuban, Native American, and 
Caucasian students alleged that the school board violated the fourteenth amendment in 
excluding them from a magnet school because of a quota system used to ensure racial balance. 
ld. at 1049. The court of appeals rejected their argument, holding that their exclusion was 
not a denial of equal protection. ld. at 1048-50. This decision lends support to the defense 
of a controlled choice plan's use of racial quotas. 
180 Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973) (Powell, j., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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plan. The fact that in nearly ten years of existence there has been 
little litigation concerning controlled choice suggests that it is ca-
pable of accomplishing its goal. Controlled choice is a promising 
plan to bring about the long-awaited end to the battle over deseg-
regation in American education. 
Eileen M. Fava 
